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I. INTRODUCTION
Concerned about rising energy prices, global climate change, and
energy security, Henry Homeowner1 decided to pursue the installation of a renewable energy system for his suburban home. After extensive research, Henry concluded that a rooftop photovoltaic solar
energy collection system was the most prudent option, taking into
consideration cost, efficiency, and feasibility of installation. Henry’s
home is located in “Resounding Residences,” a common interest development (CID),2 and initially Henry worried that installing a solar
energy device might conflict with certain restrictions on rooftop “protrusions” imposed by the development’s governing body, the Resounding Residences Community Association. However, in the course of his
 J.D. 2013, cum laude, Certificate in Environmental Law, magna cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I am greatly indebted to Professor Hannah Wiseman
for her guidance, critiques, and suggestions; Alexandra Moore, for her editing prowess; and
my parents, Diane and Ronald Rosenthal, for teaching me how to write and instilling in me
a love of learning that I will carry for life.
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research, Henry discovered that his state had recently passed the
“State Solar Rights Act of 2012,” which provided that:
A. Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents,
an association shall not prohibit the installation or use of a solar
energy device . . . .
B. An association may adopt reasonable rules regarding the
placement of a solar energy device if those rules do not prevent the
installation, impair the functioning of the device or restrict its use
or adversely affect the cost of efficiency of the device.3

Assuming that the statute would protect his solar energy system,
Henry decided to proceed as planned and contracted with a company
named Sol R Us to complete the installation. The company determined the front half of Henry’s roof, which faces the street, was the
optimal location to place and align the panels to true south.4 However, several days after work had commenced, Henry received notice
from the community association that he was in violation of a restrictive covenant prohibiting homeowners from installing rooftop devices
(excluding television satellites and antennas) that face the street,
because such devices create an aesthetic nuisance to neighbors and
can potentially lower property values. Henry responded that he was
entitled to install a solar device under the State Solar Rights Act of
2012, and besides which, the installation was almost finished.
1. Henry Homeowner is an entirely fictional character. However, his story is not so
far removed from that of real-life California homeowner Stacey Rodman, who made the
assumption that California’s solar rights law protected his right to install a solar device on
his home within a common interest development, despite conflicting covenants, conditions,
and restrictions that applied to his property. See Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 227
Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
2. CIDs possess “several essential characteristics: common ownership of residential
property, mandatory membership of all owners in an association that governs the use of
the common property, and governing documents that provide a ‘constitution’ by which the
association and its members are governed.” Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Common Interest Community, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J.
Silverman eds., 1994). See also Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity
Crisis of Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 589, 598-99 (1993) (“Simply stated, a common interest community is one in
which the property owners are tied together with a strong common interest. The interest
may be in property owned by the community association of which the owners are all members, or in property owned by the members themselves. In either case, the organization
maintains and controls the property, and it embodies the sharing of interest and cohesiveness that comes not only from a legal structure but also from that sharing.”).
3. This statute is borrowed from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816 (2012).
4. For maximum efficiency, solar collectors should be responsive to the sun, tilting to
track its path throughout the year. However, because this adds cost, many opt for fixed
solar collectors. In a fixed system, solar collectors in the northern hemisphere should always face true south, while in the southern hemisphere they should face true north. See
NORTH CAROLINA SOLAR CENTER, SITING OF ACTIVE SOLAR COLLECTORS AND PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULES 1 (Revised Sept. 2001), available at http://ncsc.ncsu.edu/wp-content/
uploads/SitingActive.pdf.
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The association filed a covenant enforcement action against Henry
seeking an injunction requiring him to remove the solar panels. The
trial court ruled in favor of the association, stating that the association’s rules were “reasonable” and did not effectively prohibit Henry
from installing a solar energy system. Later, while nursing a headache and reviewing a stack of legal and construction bills, Henry
Homeowner resolved that the costs of environmental and energy consciousness were simply not worth the benefits.
While Henry Homeowner’s saga is purely fictional, it is nonetheless emblematic of a major hurdle standing between millions of U.S.
residents and their access to residential solar energy: covenants, conditions, and restrictions, collectively referred to as “CC&Rs,” imposed
by common-interest developments. Former Vice President and climate change activist Al Gore was recently hindered by restrictive
ordinances when he attempted to install solar panels on his Tennessee home. 5 Others—real life “Henry Homeowners”—have similarly
found their access to clean, renewable solar energy limited or altogether prohibited by community associations.6
CC&Rs are “[c]ovenants running with the land,”7 dictating what a
homeowner can and cannot do with her property. Oftentimes CC&Rs
are aesthetic in nature, designed to ensure uniformity in appearance
and protect property values.8 In the realm of solar energy, CC&Rs
may outright restrict all solar devices, or they might affect the siting
of such a device (i.e., where it can and cannot be placed).
5. Gore’s situation involved a town’s ordinances, although they closely resembled the
types of CC&Rs promulgated by a CID. Gore was eventually able to install a solar energy
system, and his town has since altered its ordinances as well. See Kristina Caffrey, The
House of the Rising Sun: Homeowners’ Associations, Restrictive Covenants, Solar Panels,
and the Contract Clause, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721, 731 (2010).
6. See Scott Condon, Solar Showdown in Some Neighborhoods, VAIL DAILY (July 9,
2007), http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20070709/NEWS/70709026; Ray Henry, Homeowners Associations and Solar Panels Don’t Always Mix, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2012,
4:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/25/homeowners-associations-solarpanels_n_1451234.html; Carolyn Quinn, Homeowner Sues Association over Solar Panels,
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Oct. 21, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2008/oct/21/
homeowner-sues-association-over-solar-panels-he/.
7. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW §1.05(b)(3) (3d ed. 2000). CC&Rs are, more generally, servitudes.
They all run with the land (if written properly) and either impose negative or affirmative
obligations on all owners within the subdivision. Another non-technical definition of restrictive covenants defines them as follows: “A restrictive covenant is a promise made by
one property owner to limit the use of his or her realty . . . so as to benefit other parties.
Restrictive covenants are commonly used by planned communities to ensure that all units
adhere to a common design theme, and to prevent activities deemed to be undesirable by
the community at large.” THOMAS STARRS, LES NELSON & FRED ZALCMAN, BRINGING
SOLAR ENERGY TO THE PLANNED COMMUNITY: A HANDBOOK ON ROOFTOP S OLAR
SYSTEMS AND PRIVATE L AND USE RESTRICTIONS 12 (2000), available at
http://www.consumerenergycenter.org/erprebate/documents/CC+Rs_and_solar_rights.pdf.
8. As one attorney put it: “([H]omeowners associations) are all about looks. Is your
lawn green? Are your hedges trimmed?” Henry, supra note 6.
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State legislatures have attempted to provide protection for solar
energy users—both residential and commercial—by passing solar
access laws.9 As of 2012, forty states have some form of solar access
law on their books, with some local governments taking action as
well.10 These laws are diverse in makeup but can provide a number of
rights and protections, including: the right to install a solar device on
a property subject to countervailing building codes or local ordinances; the creation of a solar easement; and provisions mandating the
removal of vegetation that blocks sunlight.11 Twenty-one states have
also specifically addressed CC&Rs that “effectively prohibit” or “unreasonably interfere” with a homeowner’s ability to install a solar
energy generation system.12 Despite these efforts, the path to residential solar use in CIDs remains full of potential obstacles, partially
due to ineffective and unclear solar access laws that leave too much
room for community associations to continue to restrict the use and
placement of solar devices. Some associations are unaware of the solar access laws that apply to their CC&Rs.13 Other associations have
maintained outright bans on solar devices—or the equivalent—
despite the existence of laws preventing them from doing so.14
Community associations are, to a large extent, right to feel so empowered. When a homeowner within a CID wishes to undertake a
home improvement project—such as a solar installation—CC&Rs will
often require the homeowner to seek prior approval from the association’s governing board. 15 Courts are highly deferential to the decisions made by these boards; many courts apply a form of the business
judgment rule when assessing an association board’s decision. 16
9. The website “Go Solar California” defines solar access rights as “protections to
allow consumers access to sunlight (and prevent shading of systems) and to limits [sic] the
ability of homeowner associations (HOA) and local governments from preventing installation of solar energy systems.” STATE OF CAL. ET AL., Solar Rights: Access to the Sun for
Solar Systems, GO SOLAR CALIFORNIA, http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/solar_basics/
rights.php (last visited July 6, 2013).
10. State Solar Access Laws, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/
summarymaps/Solar_Access_Map.pdf (last visited July 6, 2013). Included in the forty state
total are states that have only passed provisions pertaining to the creation of solar easements.
11. See COLLEEN MCCANN KETTLES, FLA. SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH & EDUC., A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SOLAR ACCESS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Oct. 2008),
available
at
http://www.solarabcs.org/about/publications/reports/solar-access/pdfs/
Solaraccess-full.pdf.
12. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited July 6, 2013); see also infra Appendix A.
13. STARRS, NELSON & ZALCMAN, supra note 7, at 37.
14. See Condon, supra note 6 (“Some homeowners associations have adopted restrictions that make it more costly or even impossible for members to install solar electric
or thermal devices, despite a Colorado law barring such limits.”).
15. These boards are generally made up of members from the community.
16. See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321
(N.Y. 1990); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 523, 529 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987).
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Common law principles also strongly favor the enforceability of private contractual agreements, including CC&Rs.17 In the end, as one
commentator noted, “more than likely, community associations will
win in court if the family agreed to rules when joining a community.”18
Considering the deferential treatment community associations
receive in the courts, the importance of solar access laws becomes
clear—without them, homeowners face nearly impossible odds when
challenging the adverse decision of an association board. But can solar access laws turn the tide in favor of homeowners? Despite the
spread of statutes addressing solar rights, little case law involving
homeowners pitted against their associations has developed, perhaps
due to homeowners deciding to abandon their efforts rather than potentially face litigation.19 Solar access laws are also a relatively recent phenomenon.20 However, several cases indicate that courts will
carefully scrutinize the language of solar access laws in determining how they impact a traditional review of an association
board’s decision. 21 Statutory construction of these laws is thus of
critical importance.
This Note utilizes some of the case law that does exist to demonstrate how states can craft laws that effectively protect the rights of
homeowners to install a solar energy system in the face of prohibitive
CC&Rs. Part II explores the history and development of commoninterest communities. Part III surveys the various solar access laws
that exist at the state level, with a focus on how these laws affect the
rights of homeowners living in CIDs. I will also address whether
these laws can withstand scrutiny under the Contract Clause. Part
IV concerns the resolution of disputes between homeowners and associations. Finally, Part V presents some essential attributes of an
effective residential solar access law.

17. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 737.
18. Mark A. Pike, Note, Green Building Red-Lighted by Homeowners’ Associations, 33
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 923, 935 (2009).
19. Larry Lohrman, a homeowner in a CID in Salem, Oregon, successfully argued
against his community association’s rejection of his request to install solar panels. Yet at
one point, he “nearly abandoned the effort in frustration.” Henry, supra note 6.
20. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816 (2012) (enacted in 2007); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 202.010(b) (West 2012) (enacted in 2011).
21. See, e.g., Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d
167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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II. THE COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT
“With little fanfare or notice, common interest communities have
become the dominant form of new community development in the
United States . . . .”22 Yet the CID is by no means a new concept. Its
origins stem from medieval Europe, where peasants received land for
cultivation and in return promised not to use the soil in ways that
might adversely affect their neighbors.23 CIDs were imported to the
United States in the 1830s, where communities were created “to protect residents with restrictive covenants such as ones that prohibited
certain religious activities, dictated racial makeup, and prescribed
the way in which the land could be used.”24
Common interest developments began to flourish following the
Second World War, coinciding with the growth of “suburbia,”25 but
they truly exploded over a thirty-year period spanning from 1970 to
2000.26 In 1970, there were 10,000 such communities containing 2.1
million residents. 27 By 2000, there were more than 222,000 CIDs,
housing 45.2 million residents.28
As of 2012, there were 323,600 association-governed communities 29 in the United States containing some 25.9 million housing
units.30 Roughly twenty percent of all Americans live in some form of
association-governed community.31 The CID model for residential development is as popular as ever, particularly in states like California,
Florida, and Texas, where “ ‘nearly all new residential development
is governed by a [CID].’ ”32
A. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
As previously mentioned, CIDs are governed by an oftentimes
elaborate set of rules referred to collectively as covenants, conditions,

22. Steven Siegel, A New Paradigm for Common Interest Communities: Reforming
Community Associations Through the Adoption of Model Governing Documents that Reject
Intricate Rule-Bound Legal Boilerplate in Favor of Clarity, Transparency and Accountability, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 27, 28 (2011).
23. Pike, supra note 18, at 929.
24. Id. Some examples include: “New York’s Gramercy Park (1831), Boston’s Louisburg Square (1844), and San Francisco’s South Park (1852) . . . .” Id. at 929 n.39.
25. Id. at 929.
26. See Industry Data, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 6, 2013).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (“Association-governed communities include homeowners associations, condominiums, cooperatives and other planned communities.”).
30. Id.
31. See id. (stating that 63.4 million Americans live in some form of CID).
32. Siegel, supra note 22, at 30 (citation omitted).
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and restrictions (CC&Rs). 33 Such rules are typically laid out in a
community’s declaration of CC&Rs, also sometimes referred to as a
declaration of condominium.34 This “master document” is similar to a
local government’s comprehensive plan and will often contain “ ‘the
plan of development and ownership, the proposed method of operation, and the rights and responsibilities of owners within the association.’ ”35 Prior to the sale of any unit within a CID, the declaration
is—or at least is supposed to be—recorded, thus providing buyers
with actual or constructive notice of its contents.36
Community associations have at their disposal an alternative way
to create binding restrictions: ad hoc decisions and resolutions made
by the association board, typically in response to a particular case or
controversy in the community.37 These boards, generally composed of
and elected by the community’s membership, are responsible for enforcing the association’s rules.38 When a homeowner seeks to install a
solar energy generation system, she often must seek approval from
the board, as would a homeowner who wants to undertake a major
addition to his property, such as constructing a swimming pool.39 The
decision made by the board in such a situation can thereafter create a
condition or restriction affecting other CID residents.40
In the past, restrictions were utilized to preclude “undesirable”
minority and/or religious groups from owning property. 41 For instance, a number of communities in the 1940s enacted restrictions
preventing racial minorities from owning property therein.42 Similarly, in the nineteenth century, some communities enacted restrictions
that were intended to prevent alcoholism and other socially denounced habits.43 Today, CC&Rs are generally aimed at restricting
certain property uses and ensuring uniformity of appearance.44 Un-

33. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER
DENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 20 (1994).

ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESI-

34. Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663, 672 (2000).
35. Id. (quoting WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 1.05 (b)(3) (2d ed. 1988)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., KEENE MILL VILL. IV HOMEOWNERS ASS’N, ARCHITECTURAL STANDARDS
& P ROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.keenemillvillage.org/documents/
Architectural.pdf.
40. See Franzese, supra note 34, at 672.
41. Pike, supra note 18, at 929.
42. Id.
43. Dana Young, Common Interest Developments: An Historical Overview of CID Development 2 (Pub. Law Research Inst., Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law, Working
Papers Series Fall 1996-02).
44. Pike, supra note 18, at 929-30, 932.
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doubtedly, “the overall objective is to guarantee uniformity in order
to preserve stability, and, ultimately, property value.”45
B. Perception and Reality: Common Interest Developments and
Their Residents
Despite one recent commentator’s depiction of CIDs as “picky authoritarian neighborhood organizations run by ex-high school vice
principals,” 46 CIDs can and do serve some legitimate purposes; for
example, CIDs provide for the development of private infrastructure
and the creation of common recreational areas, such as swimming
pools and gymnasiums.47 Moreover, there is something to be said for
the desire of people to live in clean, safe neighborhoods, amongst
neighbors who (in theory, at least) share their values.48 Overwhelmingly, residents seem to enjoy living in CIDs, with seventy percent of
respondents to a 2012 poll rating their overall experience living in a
CID as “positive.”49 Respondents in the same poll also answered favorably when asked whether their association boards “serve the best
interests of the community as a whole.”50
Regarding the effect of CIDs on property values, the picture is not
entirely clear. Despite the fact that preserving property value is generally considered one of the cornerstone objectives of the common interest development, there is little data to support a positive correlation. One could further argue that if an association defaults on its
responsibilities and the community’s infrastructure and common ar-

45. Id. at 932.
46. Id. at 934.
47. See id. at 934 & n.83.
48. See id. In a 2007 poll of CID residents, clean/attractive neighborhoods and safe
neighborhoods were amongst the most frequently reported answers in response to the
question, “What is the single best thing about living in a community association?” ZOGBY
INT’L, FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION RESEARCH TRACKING POLL 15 (2007),
available at http://www.cmgcharleston.com/managers_files/Zogby_HOA_Survey_2007.pdf.
49. IBOPE ZOGBY INT’L, WHO SHOULD JUDGE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION SUCCESS?
THE RESIDENTS WHO LIVE IN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS! 2 (2012), available at
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Documents/National_ Homeowner_Research.pdf. It
should be noted that concerns exist regarding the partisanship of the Community Association Institute (CAI), which conducted this and other surveys referenced in this Note. Several commentators have stated that the organization appears to exist primarily to serve
the interests of “industry insiders,” that is, developers, community association managers,
lawyers, etc., rather than homeowners. Steven Siegel, The Public Role in Establishing Private Residential Communities: Towards a New Formulation of Local Government Land Use
Policies that Eliminates the Legal Requirements to Privatize New Communities in the United States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 871-72 n.31 (2006) (“CAI is well-known for protecting the
interests of the industry.”). See also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 136 (1994).
50. IBOPE ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 49, at 4. Eighty-eight percent responded that the
elected members of their association boards either absolutely, or for the most part, served
the best interests of the community as a whole. Id.
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eas fall into disrepair, property values could suffer as a result. 51
Nonetheless, CID residents believe that the CC&Rs governing their
communities “protect and enhance” property values.52 This is likely
due, at least in part, to a view that the presence of CC&Rs and association governance is a means of ensuring consistency and stability in
the community.53 As one homeowner stated, “I wanted the community to stay the way it looked when I bought my home. A homeowners’
association was the only way I could control my neighbors over time.”54
As a result of the various restrictions imposed by CC&Rs, residents must necessarily relinquish some of their freedoms. For example, many community associations prohibit basketball hoops, boats,
satellite dishes, and various other objects considered to be “aesthetic
nuisances.”55 Restrictions regulating lawn care and landscaping are
also commonplace.56 A Florida man actually served jail time after being cited by his community association for failing to maintain his
lawn.57 Another CID resident in Medford, New York was forced to
remove a statue of the Virgin Mary from her lawn,58 raising all sorts
of First Amendment questions in the process.59 As can be expected,
such restrictive measures can often breed disagreement and discon51. The author served as a law clerk at a Florida agency tasked with administrative
oversight of community association managers (CAMs). The agency frequently received
complaints from homeowners containing allegations that their community associations
were not performing their responsibilities. Complainants would often go on to argue that
their property values were suffering as a result.
52. IBOPE ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 49, at 5 (finding that in 2012, seventy-six percent
of respondents said that the rules in their community “protect and enhance” property values).
53. “One significant factor in the continued popularity of the common interest form of
property ownership is the ability of homeowners to enforce restrictive CC & R’s against
other owners (including future purchasers) of project units.” Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill.
Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 1994).
54. Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of “Voice”: Passivity, Disappointment, and Democracy in Homeowner Associations, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 157.
55. See Pike, supra note 18, at 934.
56. See Henry, supra note 6. The city of Albuquerque, New Mexico recently held that
even in the desert, CIDs can require homeowners to keep and maintain lawns. Dan McKay,
Lawns Can Be Required, City Council Votes, ABQ J. (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/032341574109newsmetro08-03-10.htm.
57. Erin Sullivan, Man Jailed for Brown Lawn Gets Help From Neighbors, ST.

PETERSBURG TIMES (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/
article850257.ece.

58. Jonathan Starkey, Condo Owners Told to Remove Religious Statues, FREE REPUB(Oct. 10, 2007, 9:46 AM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 1909162/posts.
59. A full consideration of this topic is outside the scope of this article. Some commentators have expressed concern over whether under the scaled back “State Action Doctrine,”
citizens in CIDs have contractually agreed to a curtailment of their First Amendment
rights. See generally Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions . . .
on Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 739 (2006); Aaron R. Gott, Note, Ticky Tacky Little Governments? A More
Faithful Approach to Community Associations Under the State Action Doctrine, 40 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 201 (2012).
LIC

1004

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:995

tent amongst residents. A protracted dispute over a swing set led one
homeowner in a Pennsylvania CID to ask, “Who are these little Hitlers making these rules?”60
Moreover, for some homeowners, discovering that their property is
subject to CC&Rs and association governance can come as a surprise.61 Twelve percent of respondents in a national 2007 poll of CID
residents indicated they were not informed prior to purchasing their
homes that their properties were subject to association governance.62
A survey of CID residents in Arizona found that only ten percent of
the respondents had actually read the rules prior to closing on their
homes.63 This may be due, at least in part, to ambivalence; more than
three-quarters of respondents in the same survey indicated they
placed little importance on the existence of a homeowners’ association.64 As one homeowner put it: “I would have bought my home if it
didn’t have [an association]. . . . The most important factors in my
decision were price, location, [and] functionality of the home. Presence or absence of a homeowners’ association did not sway me one
way or the other.”65
Yet homeowners interested in “going solar” may want to start paying attention. Considering community associations regulate lawn ornaments and basketball hoops, it should come as no surprise that
they also frequently restrict the placement and/or design of solar devices.66 CC&Rs might require solar devices to be placed out-of-sight of
neighboring views,67 impose setback or height restrictions,68 or even
dictate the color of solar panels. 69 Some community associations
have even gone so far as to ban any and all solar devices
without qualification.70
After one Georgia resident’s request to install a rooftop solar device was denied by his association, he compared his experience to
60. Mary McCullough, It’s a Swing Set! There Goes the Neighborhood Integrity, Value
and Beauty Are At Stake, Say a Development’s Rules. The Swing Set Must Go, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 9, 1991), http://articles.philly.com/1991-10-09/news/25814221_1_swinghomeowners-association-chartwell/2.
61. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 155.
62. ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 48, at 19.
63. Alexander, supra note 54, at 155.
64. Id. at 156.
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
67. “Solar Units not on the roof should be . . . concealed from the neighboring view.”
Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 182 Cal. App. 3d 324, n.2 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
68. “Solar Units not on the roof should be maintained a minimum of [five feet] from
property line.” Id. “Solar Units should be in or below the plane of roofing material.” Id.
69. “Panel material should be dark in color.” Id.
70. Some real-life examples include: “Solar panels and solar collectors are prohibited”;
“Exterior solar collection systems . . . or other similar appliances are prohibited.” Stan Cox,
The Property Cops: Homeowner Associations Ban Eco-Friendly Practices, ALTERNET (Apr.
25, 2007), http://www.alternet.org/envirohealth/51001.

2013]

LETTING THE SUNSHINE IN

1005

“living under communism—someone gets to dictate every possible
thing you do.”71 The next section discusses one of the primary means
by which states have acted to protect the rights of citizens and businesses seeking to employ a solar energy generation system: solar
access laws.
III. SOLAR ACCESS LAWS
Although solar access laws are a relatively recent phenomenon,
the concept of a “right to sunlight” is considerably older.72 The doctrine of “Ancient Lights” is an English common law concept whereby
“a person who opened a window in his house had a natural right to
receive the flow of light that passed through it.”73 The doctrine essentially created a negative easement preventing the owner of property
from obstructing sunlight to her neighbors.74 This common law principle was eventually codified in the Prescription Act of 1832:
When the access and use of light to and for any . . . building shall
have been actually enjoyed therewith for the full period of twenty
years without interruption, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, any local usage or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed
by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that
purpose by deed or writing.75

However, the doctrine of Ancient Lights was never incorporated
into American common law.76 Concerned the doctrine would thwart
development,77 U.S. courts have consistently rejected a common law
right to sunlight, as evidenced, for example, in Fontainebleau Hotel
Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.78
Perhaps due in part to the absence of common law protections, the
majority of states have enacted some form of solar access law.79 To be
sure, in passing these laws, some states seek to promote the use of
renewable energy,80 and not just to ensure that residents have ade71. Henry, supra note 6.
72. KETTLES, supra note 11, at iii.
73. Id. at 1.
74. Id.
75. Prescription Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, § 3 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Will4/2-3/71/section/3.
76. See KETTLES, supra note 11, at 2.
77. Debbie Leonard & Denise Pasquale, Legal Tools to Protect Access to Solar
and Wind Resources, NEV. LAWYER, July 2009, at 14, 15, available at
http://www.mcdonaldcarano.com/read_news/view.asp?ID=133.
78. 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). “No American decision has been cited,
and independent research has revealed none, in which it has been held that—in the absence of some contractual or statutory obligation—a landowner has a legal right to the free
flow of light and air across the adjoining land of his neighbor.” Id.
79. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note 12.
80. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-7 (2012) (“The legislature finds that in view of
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quate light to grow gardens or avoid shading of their pool. In Florida,
for example, “[t]he Legislature intends that the use of solar energy,
renewable energy sources, highly efficient systems, cogeneration, and
load-control systems be encouraged.”81 Analysis of state solar access
laws reveals that they vary in scope and nature. This section will
survey the protections such laws provide to homeowners.
A. Solar Access Laws and the Contract Clause: “To Unreasonably
Restrict or Not to Unreasonably Restrict”
Although forty states have enacted some form of solar access law,
only twenty-one contain any sort of provision directed at CC&Rs.82
While the language of these statutes varies, virtually all of them provide that community associations may continue to promulgate and
enforce “reasonable” regulations pertaining to solar energy systems.
Specifically, eighteen of the twenty-one state statutes that address
CC&Rs allow for either: (1) “reasonable restrictions,” 83 or (2) restrictions that either do not “effectively prohibit” or “unduly restrict”84 a homeowner’s ability to install a solar device.85 For instance,
a Colorado law provides that “[a] covenant, restriction, or condition
contained in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument . . . that effectively prohibits or restricts the installation or
use of a renewable energy generation device is void and unenforceable.”86 In Wisconsin, “[a]ll restrictions on platted land that prevent or
unduly restrict the construction and operation of solar energy systems . . . are void.”87
Why not enact a law containing a blanket prohibition of CC&Rs
that have any effect on the ability of a homeowner to install a solar
device? To be sure, legislatures simply might not be willing to go that
the present energy crisis, all renewable energy sources must be encouraged for the benefit
of the state as a whole. The legislature further finds that solar energy is a viable energy
source in New Mexico, and as such, its development should be encouraged. Since solar
energy may be used in small-scale installations and one of the ways to accomplish such
encouragement is by protection of rights necessary for small-scale installations, the legislature declares such protection to be the purpose of the Solar Recordation Act and necessary
to the public interest.”).
81. Fla. H.R. Envtl. & Natural Res. Council, HB 7135 (2008) Staff Analysis 3 (final
Apr. 16, 2008).
82. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note 12. See
also infra Appendix A for a complete breakdown of solar access laws and how they relate to
CC&Rs.
83. States following this model are these: Louisiana, California, Nevada, Utah (but
only plat renewal/approval), Indiana, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Massachusetts, and
Washington. See infra Appendix A.
84. States following this model are these: Wisconsin, Colorado, New Mexico, Illinois,
West Virginia, North Carolina, Vermont, and Florida. See infra Appendix A.
85. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 163.04 (2012).
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168(1)(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
87. WIS. STAT. § 236.292(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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far. Yet the answer also may lie, at least in part, in Article I, Section
10, Clause 1 of the Constitution, also known as the Contract Clause.88
A large body of scholarship exists concerning the Contract Clause,
and a full discussion is well beyond the scope of this Note.89 Nonetheless, some discussion is necessary in order to understand why state
and local governments may err on the side of caution and, additionally, why such caution may potentially be unwarranted.
The Contract Clause limits the power of the state and federal government to pass laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” 90 A
plain language reading of the Contract Clause therefore might indicate that governments have virtually no power to pass legislation
that affects the ability of private parties to freely contract. Yet this is
far from a reality. The seminal case pertaining to the Contract
Clause is Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.91 In this case, in
which the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law
passed during the Great Depression that postponed foreclosure sales,
the Court described in great detail the history and intent of the Contract Clause. 92 The Court explained that the Contract Clause was
particularly intended to cover one type of contractual relationship in
particular—“that which exists between debtor and creditor.”93
The more recent case of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co.94 specifically addressed the Contract Clause as it
relates to the police power. There, the Supreme Court found that
where a state law impairs contractual interests but “rests on, and is
prompted by, significant and legitimate state interests,”95 such a law
might be proper. The Court fashioned a multi-part method of analysis for addressing such claims.96 First, a court must decide whether
the law in question has “ ‘operated as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship.’ ”97 If a substantial impairment exists, then
the state “must [offer] a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation.”98 After the state has identified its public purpose, the court must consider “whether the adjustment of ‘the rights
and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
89. For an extensive discussion of the Contract Clause as it pertains to solar access
laws—and why such laws can withstand scrutiny under the Contract Clause—see Caffrey,
supra note 5, at 748-58.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
91. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
92. Id. at 427-30.
93. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 750 (citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427).
94. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
95. Id. at 416.
96. Id. at 411-12.
97. Id. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244
(1978)).
98. Id. at 411 (citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
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conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose
justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.’ ”99
This final prong, wherein the adjustment of a contract must be
based upon “reasonable conditions,”100 contains the key to why state
statutes allow CIDs to have at least some ability to regulate solar devices. It is furthermore, at least in the eyes of one commentator, the
reason why a number of states specifically reference the word “reasonable” in their statutes. 101 “The statutes definitely do adjust the
rights and responsibilities of the individual and the community association, but they do so in a reasonable way—and some of the better
drafted laws even define ‘reasonable.’ ”102
Would state legislation that declares void any covenant that affects a homeowner’s ability to install a solar device withstand a challenge under the Contract Clause? The answer is unclear, although it
is worth noting that the test advanced by the Court in Energy Reserves Group leaves substantial discretion to the courts in its application. There are thus several avenues by which such a law could potentially survive scrutiny under the Contract Clause. A court could
avoid the reasonableness question altogether by finding that the
law’s impairment of contractual obligations does not rise to the level
of “substantial.” Alternatively, Kristina Caffrey has suggested that in
regulating the placement of solar devices, community associations
have essentially assumed a function traditionally performed by state
and local governments: “All the way back to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, state and local governments have told property owners
what they can and cannot do and where they can or cannot do
it.”103 Thus, courts could view solar access laws as “taking back”
the responsibility of zoning and land use planning from
community associations.104
Should a court find that a solar access law imposes a substantial
impairment, it could nonetheless uphold the law under the reasonableness prong, especially in light of what it may see as a particularly
important public purpose (i.e., decreasing dependence on foreign oil,
climate change and air pollution concerns, or rising energy prices).
Furthermore, considering the way in which Contract Clause analysis
has changed over the years,105 often in response to the “times,” it is
conceivable that the Court could continue to refine its approach. One
99. Id. at 412 (quoting U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22).
100. Id.
101. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 756.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 755 (footnote omitted).
104. Id. (alteration in original).
105. For instance, consider the different analyses adopted by the court in the two cases
described above, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. 459 U.S. 400
(1983), and Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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way in which it could potentially do so would be to focus on the application of the contractual obligation in question. For instance, CC&Rs
that conflict with solar access laws may be deemed void as applied to
solar panels ad hoc, yet legitimate as applied to other things (such as
a television antenna or other object that does not provide the utility
of a solar device).
Before leaving this brief inquiry into the Contract Clause, it bears
mentioning that homeowners might themselves attempt to invoke
the Contract Clause to argue that CC&Rs are preventing them from
entering contractual agreements with utility companies. Such an “inverse” Contract Clause argument would run as follows: in recent
years, a number of utility providers have entered into “net energy
metering” (NEM) contracts with residential customers that have installed solar electrical systems.106 Under such an agreement,
the customer’s electric meter keeps track of how much electricity is
consumed by the customer, and how much excess electricity is
generated by the system and sent back into the electric utility grid.
. . . [T]he customer has to pay only for the net amount of electricity
used from the utility over-and-above the amount of electricity generated by their solar system.107

A homeowner might therefore argue that CC&Rs are impairing her
right to enter into NEM contracts. Naturally, this line of reasoning
raises a number of other contractual issues that are well beyond the
scope of this Note. Nonetheless, it is illustrative of an untapped
means by which homeowners can challenge anti-solar CC&Rs.
B. The Curious Case of Oregon
Enacted in 2012, Oregon’s residential solar access law employs a
unique method of regulating residential solar energy. 108 Instead of
allowing certain “reasonable” restrictions on solar devices and then
working to define those restrictions, the statute takes the opposite
approach. First, it grants a presumption of validity to solar devices in
any area zoned as residential, by stating that “[t]he installation and
use on a residential structure of a solar photovoltaic energy system or
a solar thermal energy system is an outright permitted use in any
zone in which residential structures are an allowed use.”109 The statute then establishes that approval of a homeowner’s permit to install
a solar device is a “ministerial function,”110 so long as:
106. STATE OF CAL. ET AL., Net Energy Metering in California, GO SOLAR CALIFORNIA,
http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/solar_basics/net_metering.php (last visited July 6,
2013).
107. Id.
108. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.505 (2012).
109. Id. § 227.505(1) (emphasis added).
110. Id. § 227.505(3).
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(a) The installation of a solar energy system can be accomplished
without increasing the footprint of the residential or commercial
structure or the peak height of the portion of the roof on which the
system is installed; and
(b) The solar energy system would be mounted so that the plane of
the system is parallel to the slope of the roof.111

By classifying the granting of a solar permit as a ministerial act
and then laying out the only applicable qualifications, the statute
appears to broadly empower homeowners. However, questions remain. Although the law makes approval of a permit a ministerial
function, it does not speak to CC&Rs that might nonetheless apply to
a homeowner living within a CID. One could imagine a situation
where a homeowner receives a permit, yet an association board does
not grant approval to a homeowner’s solar installation. Can the
homeowner proceed and argue that (a) he had a validly issued permit, and (b) the statute states that the installation of a solar device is
an outright permitted use?
Moreover, the statute may implicate the Contract Clause as well.
Recall the test employed by the Court in Energy Reserves Group, requiring a consideration of “whether the adjustment of ‘the rights and
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions.’ ”112 Associations will likely argue that under Oregon’s law,
calling it an “adjustment” of rights is a misnomer, as they can claim
to have lost all of their rights under existing CC&Rs to regulate the
use and placement of solar devices. Yet as previously discussed, there
are several lines of reasoning a reviewing court could invoke to uphold the law.113
Presently, I am unaware of any pending challenges to Oregon’s
solar access law predicated on the Contract Clause, although it
should be noted that as of this writing, the law has been in place for
less than a year. Unfortunately, despite the forthcoming discussion114
pertaining to the importance of precisely defining the rights of the
affected parties (homeowners and community associations) in the interest of avoiding costly litigation, the courts may eventually be
needed to determine whether laws such as Oregon’s can withstand
constitutional scrutiny.

111. Id.
112. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412
(1983) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
113. See supra Part III.A.
114. See infra Part V.A (discussing ambiguous statutory language).
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IV. UP AGAINST THE ODDS: RESOLUTION OF
HOMEOWNER/ASSOCIATION DISPUTES
As one commentator recently noted, “the broad rule-making and
rule-enforcement functions entrusted to association boards renders
conflict inevitable.”115 Consider the following case study:
In the unusually warm autumn months of 2010, the High Desert
homeowners’ Board of Directors in Albuquerque, New Mexico, exploded in controversy. The issue? A resident complained about the
solar panels on a neighbor's roof. . . . In this dispute between individual neighbors, the governing body of the High Desert development will eventually have to take a position on the future of solar
energy in the neighborhood–if not an actual substantive position,
then at least a position on resolving disputes between neighbors
over solar energy. . . . New Mexico’s solar-siting-guarantee statute
will also likely come into play, although it may prove more of a
problem than a solution. Given the extremely problematic language of New Mexico’s statute, this small-scale controversy could
easily erupt into a huge mess with both sides arguing over statutory construction and public policy. One board member even warned,
“[w]e’ll end up in court if someone doesn’t get a handle on this.”116

Despite the board member’s warning, there is a scant body of case
law featuring homeowners seeking judicial approval of a solar project
in the face of prohibitive CC&Rs and/or an adverse decision by an
association board. Homeowners may simply abandon plans for a solar
device in the face of potential legal hurdles, figuring that the up-front
costs of installation are substantial enough as is before factoring in
legal fees, as well (think Henry Homeowner). Others likely realize
that any legal challenge they could mount faces an uphill battle considering the deference courts give to the decisions of community association boards. 117 The first two sections of this Part concern the
standard of review and burden of proof utilized by courts when cases
pitting homeowners against their community associations come before them. The third section takes a look at a case involving a solarinclined homeowner that did end up in court.
A. Judicial Deference to Community Associations
As briefly discussed in the introduction, courts have generally
treated the decisions of community association boards with considerable deference. 118 However, the actual standard under which such
cases are evaluated varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, despite

115.
116.
117.
118.

Franzese, supra note 34, at 674.
Caffrey, supra note 5, at 723-24 (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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the proclamation by at least one court that “a single standard for judicial review of the propriety of board action is desirable.”119
Many courts apply a form of the business judgment rule in reviewing actions taken by an association board.120 A concept borrowed from
corporate law, the business judgment rule establishes the presumption that the directors of a corporation are motivated “in their conduct by a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose
affairs the stockholders have committed to their charge.”121 In other
words, directors receive the benefit of the doubt that their actions
were in the best interest of the corporation, and substantial evidence
to the contrary is required to find otherwise. Many such cases also
involve a discussion of fiduciary duties,122 thus clearly establishing
that many courts see association boards as roughly analogous to
corporate entities.123
In fact, the majority of modern community associations are incorporated as non-profit corporations. 124 However, commentators have
pointed out the flaws in applying standard corporate law to these entities: “[T]o superimpose corporate or business models upon residential, family settings seems inconsistent with, if not a dehumanization
of, the values, norms, and needs of home life.”125 The decisions of association boards have a real, tangible impact on the way in which
people live within their homes and communities. This is not to say
that the decisions of a standard corporation’s board are not capable of
having a direct impact on individuals; on the contrary, they often
have profound repercussions. Yet while corporations exist for the
purpose of maximizing profit,126 community associations exist for the
betterment of the communities they serve.
Moreover, corporate directors cannot ensure the success of their
actions, as they are limited by various unknowns, often in the form of
market uncertainties. Their decisions therefore require an additional
degree of protection; courts have responded by dismissing claims
where a director acted in good faith, but it becomes clear in hindsight

119. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 533 N.E.2d 1317, 1323 (N.Y.
1990).
120. See id.; see also Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980
P.2d 940, 947-50 (Cal. 1999); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, 523
N.Y.S.2d 523, 528-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
121. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974).
122. See, e.g., Levandusky, 533 N.E.2d at 1322.
123. See, e.g., Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condo., 401 A.2d 280, 285-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1979) (applying a hybrid reasonableness/business analysis to a condominium association’s decision to impose penalties on unit owners who failed to pay part of assessment).
124. Franzese, supra note 34, at 668.
125. Id. See also Gott, supra note 59, at 216 n.104 (explaining that the purposes behind
the business judgment rule are not served by its application to community associations).
126. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919).
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that she acted in a way that ultimately hurt the corporation.127 In
contrast, community associations do not deal with nearly the same
breadth of challenges. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to grant
association directors the presumption of the business judgment rule
on the basis that their primary task is to protect property values,
thus equating their function with that of a traditional corporate director. This is hardly their sole function.
A number of other courts have evaluated the actions of association
boards under a more general standard of “reasonableness.”128 While
typically not as deferential as the business judgment rule, this can
still be a very deferential standard, depending on the court applying
it. In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n,129 the Supreme Court of California upheld the validity of a residential community’s ban on household pets.130 A California statute established
that a community association’s CC&Rs are enforceable “unless unreasonable.”131 The court identified three circumstances under which
a particular covenant, condition, or restriction might be deemed unreasonable: “[the restriction] violates public policy; it bears no rational relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose
of the affected land; or it otherwise imposes burdens on the affected
land that are so disproportionate to the restriction’s beneficial effects
that the restriction should not be enforced.”132 The court emphasized
that the outcome of cases where the validity of a private CC&R is at
issue should not rest on a case-by-case inquiry into the objecting
homeowner’s particular circumstances. 133 Rather, the appropriate
inquiry concerns the effect of the restriction on the community as a
whole, and whether the restriction is so repugnant as to fit into one
of the three categories of exceptions identified by the court.134 In establishing such a deferential standard, the court made clear that it
was sympathetic to protecting the reasonable expectations of consenting homeowners. The court also expressed concern over the potential for “increases in association fees to fund the defense of legal
challenges to recorded restrictions.”135
However, while the court in Nahrstedt undoubtedly imposed a
substantial burden on those seeking to challenge a CC&R, it also
127. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the rationale behind the business judgment rule).
128. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal. 1994); see
also River Terrace Condo. Ass’n v. Lewis, 514 N.E.2d 732, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
129. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d 1275.
130. Id. at 1292.
131. Id. at 1286.
132. Id. at 1287.
133. Id. at 1290.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1288.
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may have created an avenue through which courts can provide relief
to homeowners specifically in the realm of solar installations. The
first of the three exceptional circumstances identified by the court
concerns CC&Rs that are abhorrent to public policy.136 It follows that
particularly where state legislatures have addressed the importance
of solar energy via statute, this may create the requisite evidence of
countervailing policy needed to overturn CC&Rs that restrict residential solar use. We will come back to this idea at the end of Part V.
B. Burden of Proof?
To make matters worse for homeowners seeking relief from burdensome restrictions, courts generally place the burden of demonstrating that a CID’s land use restrictions are “unreasonable” squarely on the party challenging those restrictions.137 The burden of proof
typically will remain with the homeowner, even where a state statute
protects the homeowner from unreasonable restrictions that “effectively prohibit” or “unduly interfere” with the placement and/or functioning of a solar device. 138 This stems from the legal principle
whereby a “party seeking a right or benefit under a statute bears the
burden of proving that he comes within the ambit of the statute.”139
This is exemplified in Fox Creek Community Ass’n v. Carson,140
where the court stated at the outset of its analysis that “the homeowner has the burden to show that a deed restriction effectively prohibits a solar device.”141 The court in Garden Lakes Community Ass’n
v. Madigan142 echoed this sentiment in stating, “[t]he Association correctly asserts that the burden of proof was on the homeowners to
prove that the Declaration and guidelines effectively prohibited them
from installing and using a solar energy device.”143
C. The Interaction of CC&Rs and Solar Access Laws—A Case Study
The 2011 case Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin144 consisted of a familiar factual scenario. A homeowner wanted to
136. Id. at 1287-88.
137. See, e.g., id. at 1286 (discussing the burden of showing a particular land use restriction rests on the party challenging the land use restriction).
138. See Fox Creek Cmty. Ass’n v. Carson, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0676, 2012 WL 2793206, at
*3 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 10, 2012) (unpublished) (noting that the burden rests with the
homeowner to show that a deed restriction effectively prevents the installation of a solar
device); see also Garden Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Madigan, 62 P.3d 983, 987 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003).
139. Harvest v. Craig, 990 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
140. Fox Creek Community Ass’n, 2012 WL 2793206.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Garden Lakes Community Ass’n, 62 P.3d 983.
143. Id. at 987.
144. 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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install a photovoltaic solar energy generation system on a hillside
slope located on his property. 145 The CC&Rs of the community required homeowners to submit all proposals for improvements to an
Architectural Control Committee, which was made up of volunteers
from the community.146 The committee denied the homeowner’s application, citing CC&Rs pertaining to drainage and erosion as well as
aesthetic considerations. 147 In spite of this, the homeowner went
along with the installation, and the association brought suit. 148 At
trial, the jury found in favor of the association, and the homeowner
subsequently appealed.149
In upholding the trial court’s decision, the district court of appeals
found that “[t]he determination of whether Tesoro’s CC & R’s and
Design Guidelines imposed ‘reasonable’ restrictions was necessarily a
question of fact for the jury.”150 Yet the court also undertook its own
analysis of the reasonableness of the association’s actions. 151 The
court began with familiar rhetoric, noting the “presumption of validity” generally afforded to CC&Rs, absent a showing that, as established in Nahrstedt, “they are wholly arbitrary, violate a fundamental public policy or impose a burden on the use of affected land that
far outweighs any benefit.”152 Along similar lines, the court afforded
substantial weight to the decision of the association’s committee to
deny the installation.153
However, the court also conducted an inquiry into the limitations
on a community association’s authority to regulate solar devices set
forth in California’s solar access law, 154 demonstrating that courts
will pay close attention to these laws in determining how they impact
an analysis of a traditional homeowner-community association dispute. California’s residential solar access law allows for community
associations to impose “reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems. . . . that do not significantly increase the cost of the system or
significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that
allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and
energy conservation benefits.”155 In 2004, California went the extra
145. Id. at 171.
146. Id. at 170-71.
147. Id. at 172.
148. Id. at 173.
149. Id. at 175.
150. Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 177-79.
152. Id. at 177 (quoting Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1287
(Cal. 1994)).
153. Id. at 178 (“The CC & R’s provide that the approval or disapproval of applications
for improvements ‘shall be in the sole and absolute discretion of the [ACC] and may be
based upon such aesthetic considerations as the [ACC] determines to be appropriate.’ ”).
154. Id. at 177-79.
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(b) (West 2012).
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mile and amended its statute to actually define, via reference to numerical valuations, what is meant by “significantly increase cost” and
decrease efficiency.156 The statute states that restrictions on photovoltaic systems cannot decrease the system’s efficiency by more than
twenty percent or increase its cost by more than $2000.157 The nail in
the coffin for the homeowner in Tesoro was expert testimony indicating that solar energy systems permitted by the association were comparable to the one installed by the homeowner in terms of efficiency
and cost.158 The court cited the expert’s findings that an alternative
system would only decrease efficiency by fourteen percent and would
actually be cheaper.159
There is a fundamental tension in cases such as Tesoro between
courts wanting to fall back on old habits and accord deference to
community associations, and solar access laws that seem to be pulling them in the other direction. The following section describes concrete ways by which state legislatures can construct solar access laws
that effectively protect homeowners—and what role courts can play
in the process.
V. LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
When it comes to residential solar access laws, policymakers have
several models from which to choose. They can opt for a broad, ministerial approach like that of Oregon, though it remains to be seen how
such a law interacts with CC&Rs in addition to whether it can withstand scrutiny under the Contract Clause. 160 By far and away the
most popular form involves exceptions for CC&Rs that do not “unduly restrict” solar devices or that impose “reasonable restrictions.”161
Some states, such as California, take the next step and create guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction. 162 Finally, a
handful of state statutes do not utilize a “reasonableness” standard
but rather establish themselves the precise ways in which community associations may regulate solar devices.163
156. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 789 (West) (“This bill would redefine the term ‘significantly’ with regard to the restrictions imposed on solar domestic water heating systems or
swimming pool heating systems and photovoltaic systems, as specified.”).
157. CIV. § 714(d)(1)(A)-(B).
158. Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 178-79.
159. Id.
160. See supra Part III.B (discussing OR. REV. STAT. § 227.505 (2012)).
161. See supra Part III.A (discussing the various types of state solar access laws).
162. CIV. § 714(d).
163. See infra Appendix A. Three states have adopted a “reasonable-free” approach:
Texas, Hawaii, and New Jersey. New Jersey’s statute, for example, reads as follows:
b. An association may adopt rules to regulate the installation and maintenance
of solar collectors on those roofs as specified in subsection a. of this section, in
accordance with subsection c. of this section, and as follows: (1) The qualifica-
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This section identifies four essential attributes of a solar access
law that effectively protects the rights of homeowners in CIDs. A
common theme connects them all: States should craft laws that divest the courts, to the greatest extent possible, of their discretionary
power in analyzing the “reasonableness” of a community association’s
covenants, conditions, and restrictions pertaining to solar energy use.
Not only will this help curb the broad judicial deference afforded to
community associations, but it will also serve to guide both residents
and community associations in helping them establish who has what
rights in the realm of residential solar installations.
A. Specify the Scope
Legislators must make absolutely clear that the provisions of a
solar access law apply to all association governed communities and
their CC&Rs. The importance of this is illustrated in the evolution of
Florida’s solar access law.164 The statute as originally enacted read as
follows: “[T]he adoption of an ordinance by a governing body, as those
terms are defined in this chapter, which prohibits or has the effect of
prohibiting the installation of solar collectors, clotheslines, or other
energy devices based on renewable resources is expressly prohibited.”165
In 1991, John Taylor installed a rooftop solar energy system on his
Palm Beach County home.166 His community association brought suit
seeking to require Taylor to remove the device.167 The Fourth District
Court of Appeals held that the above-cited statute did not apply to
community associations.168 Another statute defined “governing bodies” as political entities; in the court’s view, community associations
tions, certification and insurance requirements of personnel or contractors who
may install the solar collectors; (2) The location where solar collectors may be
placed on roofs; (3) The concealment of solar collectors’ supportive structures,
fixtures and piping; (4) The color harmonization of solar collectors with the colors of structures or landscaping in the development; and (5) The aggregate size
or coverage or total number of solar collectors … (1) An association shall not
adopt and shall not enforce any rule related to the installation or maintenance
of solar collectors, if compliance with a rule or rules would increase the solar
collectors’ installation or maintenance costs by an amount which is estimated
to be greater than 10 percent of the total cost of the initial installation of the solar collectors, including the costs of labor and equipment. (2) An association
shall not adopt and shall not enforce any rule related to the installation or
maintenance of solar collectors, if compliance with such rules inhibits the solar
collectors from functioning at their intended maximum efficiency.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:22A-48.2b.-c. (West 2012). There is no reference to reasonableness in
the statute. Instead, the state lays out the ways in which solar CC&Rs may regulate solar
devices and the relevant criteria to assess compliance (a cost and efficiency standard).
164. FLA. STAT. § 163.04 (2012).
165. Id. § 163.04 (1989).
166. Taylor v. Ridge at the Bluffs Homeowners Ass’n, 579 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1991).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 896-97.
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did not fit under this definition.169 The original statute did not clearly
identify whether it applied to community associations. It should come
as no surprise at this point that in the wake of this uncertainty, the
court defaulted to an association-friendly interpretation that protected the enforceability of CC&Rs.170
One year later, Florida responded by inserting an additional provision in the statute, which read:
No deed restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements
running with the land shall prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices based on
renewable resources from being installed on buildings erected on
the lots or parcels covered by the deed restrictions, covenants, or
binding agreements. A property owner may not be denied permission to install solar collectors or other energy devices based on renewable resources by any entity granted the power or right in any
deed restriction, covenant, or similar binding agreement to approve, forbid, control, or direct alteration of property with respect
to residential dwellings not exceeding three stories in height.171

In 2008, the Florida legislature added additional protection for
homeowners in CIDs by replacing the phrase “not exceeding three stories in height” with “within the boundaries of a condominium unit.”172
B. Define “Reasonable” Restrictions as Narrowly as Possible
Through References to Numerical Valuations of Cost and Efficiency
As previously discussed, statutes that utilize the term “reasonableness” in defining the permitted means by which a community association may regulate the installation and placement of solar panels
might have an advantage if subjected to a challenge under the Contract Clause.173 However, whether the statute uses “reasonableness,”
“effectively prohibits,” “unduly interferes with,” et cetera, it is critically important that the statute goes on to define with specificity
what this term really means. Doing so serves to limit the potential
interpretations an association board or court can come up with on its
own. The ideal means by which to define these terms is through reference to cost and efficiency. Reasonable restrictions ought to be defined as those that do not potentially increase the cost of installation
169. § 163.3164 (1989); Taylor, 579 So. 2d at 897.
170. See Taylor, 579 So. 2d at 896-97.
171. Act effective Oct. 1, 1992, ch. 92-89, § 1(2), 1992 Fla. Laws 845, 845-46 (emphasis
added) (codified as amended at § 163.04 (1992)).
172. § 163.04(2) (2012) (“A property owner may not be denied permission to install
solar collectors or other energy devices by any entity granted the power or right in any
deed restriction, covenant, declaration, or similar binding agreement to approve, forbid,
control, or direct alteration of property with respect to residential dwellings and within the
boundaries of a condominium unit.” (emphasis added)).
173. See supra Part III.A.
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or decrease the efficiency of operation more than a specified percentage, ideally something along the lines of ten or fifteen percent. While
a handful of states already maintain such provisions,174 the vast majority of residential solar access laws do not. Statutes should strive to
specify a numerical value so as to take this determination out of the
hands of courts and association boards.
Consider, for example, Arizona’s solar access law:
A. Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents,
an association shall not prohibit the installation or use of a solar
energy device . . . .
B. An association may adopt reasonable rules regarding the
placement of a solar energy device if those rules do not prevent the
installation, impair the functioning of the device or restrict its use
or adversely affect the cost or efficiency of the device.
C. Notwithstanding any provision of the community documents,
the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to any
party who substantially prevails in an action against the board of
directors of the association for a violation of this section.175

This is not a bad law by any means, as it provides some guidance
as to what constitutes reasonableness through a reference to cost and
efficiency. However, by not defining efficiency and cost with a reference to specific numerical values, the statute leaves too much discretion in the hands of courts and association boards. Is a thirty percent
increase in cost reasonable? What about fifty percent? The deference
likely to be accorded to a community association’s decision in such a
situation has (hopefully) been established at this point.
Instead of making any reference to “reasonableness” and thus instilling a reviewing court or community association with some inkling
of discretion, no matter how small, states might alternatively choose
to enumerate via statute precisely what sort of restrictions or prohibitions a community association may enforce. Texas’ solar access law
provides an excellent example of such specificity. Passed in 2011, the
statute reads, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by [s]ubsection (d), a
property owners’ association may not include or enforce a provision in
a dedicatory instrument that prohibits or restricts a property owner
from installing a solar energy device.”176 Subsection (d) specifies how
174. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(d) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. §196-7(b) (2012) (“Every private entity shall adopt rules by December 31, 2006, that provide for the placement of
solar energy devices, and revise those rules as necessary by July 1, 2011. The rules shall
facilitate the placement of solar energy devices and shall not impose conditions or restrictions that render the device more than twenty-five per cent less efficient or increase
the cost of installation, maintenance, and removal of the device by more than fifteen per
cent.”).
175. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816 (2012).
176. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.010(b) (West 2012).
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a community may regulate a solar device.177 Enforceable restrictions
include: height, slope, and color requirements as well as the requirement that the homeowner seek approval from an association board.178
However, the board may not withhold approval if the homeowner
complies with the other requirements of subsection (d) “unless the
association . . . determines in writing that placement of the device as
proposed by the property owner constitutes a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities.”179
C. Eliminate the Ability of Community Associations to Restrict Solar
Devices on Solely Aesthetic Grounds
While states may choose to allow community associations to continue to restrict solar panels in certain ways, restrictions based solely
on aesthetic justifications should be removed from that calculus. A
2007 survey found that fifty-nine percent of CID residents believe
their community association should have the right to restrict the siting and use of solar devices on aesthetic grounds.180 Yet as one commentator noted, “[i]n this situation the residential majority is just
plain wrong.”181
Although some CID residents may take comfort in the fact that
every house on the street is white with fuchsia trim and a white
picket fence, ensuring uniformity should not be a viable justification
for prohibiting solar devices considering the substantial economic
and environmental benefits associated with solar energy. Moreover,
while some consider solar devices an eyesore, others may find them
aesthetically pleasing or, at the very least, minimally distracting.
Residents may believe that the aesthetic restrictions imposed by
their community associations are protecting their property values,
but there is limited data to support this claim.182 In the absence of a
more concrete justification, states should seek to limit the power of
community associations to restrict the solar rights of homeowners on
aesthetic grounds alone. The Texas statute previously cited sets a
good example by requiring an association to show that a homeowner’s
solar device causes “unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons
of ordinary sensibilities.”183
Moreover, when it comes to aesthetic-based CC&Rs affecting solar
devices, courts have once again demonstrated they will carefully con177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. § 202.010(d).
Id. § 202.010(d)(5).
Id. § 202.010(e).
ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 48, at 19.
Caffrey, supra note 5, at 722.
See supra Part II.B (regarding the effect of CIDs on property values).
PROP. § 202.010(e).

2013]

LETTING THE SUNSHINE IN

1021

sider whether any applicable solar access law has addressed the legitimacy of such restrictions. To return once more to Tesoro, the court
noted that when associations consider applications for solar projects,
“[n]othing in the language of section 714 [of the California Solar
Rights Act] prohibits the consideration of aesthetic impacts.”184 The
court also cited language from California’s solar access law indicating
the legislature intended applications for solar projects to be processed
and approved according to the same standards and procedures as any
other application for an architectural modification. 185 Had California’s law contained a measure prohibiting aesthetic restrictions from
being the sole basis upon which a solar application is denied, the
court would have had to reconsider its analysis.
D. Affirmative Statement of Public Policy
Solar access laws should ideally leave little doubt as to their intent. One should not have to search through legislative history to find
an affirmative declaration that in passing this law, State X intends to
promote the residential use of solar energy systems and the removal
of all impediments and obstacles to this extent. Once again, the purpose here is to provide a clear statement of intent to any potential
reviewing body. States should endeavor to equip courts with as many
tools as possible by which to protect the rights of homeowners.
California’s solar access law has an exemplary provision:
(b) This section does not apply to provisions that impose reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it is the policy of
the state to promote and encourage the use of solar energy systems
and to remove obstacles thereto. Accordingly, reasonable restrictions on a solar energy system are those restrictions that do
not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that allow for an
alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and energy
conservation benefits.186

The California legislature leaves little doubt as to the statute’s intent. The importance of incorporating a statement of policy into the
statute itself will become clearer in the next subsection.
E. A Role for the Courts—Deference to Solar Access Laws and
Tapping into the “Public Policy” Exception
Where states take the advice of this Note and utilize numerical
valuations to define reasonable restrictions, one can envision cases
184. Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 178
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
185. Id.
186. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(b) (West 2012).
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boiling down to “battles of the experts,” or in other words, whether a
particular deed restriction is affecting the cost and performance of a
solar device by more or less than what is specified in the statute. In
such a situation, will courts side with the association and afford them
their usual deference? Or will they sympathize with homeowners
seeking protection under solar access laws? Courts are needed in
these and similar situations to lay down strong precedent in favor of
homeowners and residential access to solar energy. Where statutes
fall short in fully enumerating the solar rights of homeowners, or
where there is a unique factual scenario not contemplated by the legislature, courts can fall back on a potentially powerful tool, should
they choose to do so—the public policy exception.
Recall that in Nahrstedt, the court established three potential
lines of reasoning through which a reviewing court might invalidate
a particular covenant, condition, or restriction pertaining to real
property.187 The first of these is the so-called public policy exception:
a court may decline to enforce a deed restriction that is shown to be
patently in violation of public policy.188 Naturally, this sort of inquiry
provides a lot of room for a court to draw its own conclusions. Yet the
mere existence of a statute addressing residential solar access rights
should provide evidence that association restrictions affecting the use
and/or placement of a solar device are not in accordance with public
policy–even where said statute does not clearly identify the state’s
policy with regard to solar energy.
In the 2003 case of Garden Lakes Community Ass’n v. Madigan,189
homeowners in an Arizona CID installed a solar energy generation
system on their home.190 In doing so, they failed to comply with a
number of the community’s CC&Rs, including aesthetic requirements
and a requirement that they seek prior approval from the association
board.191 However, the court found in favor of the homeowners, holding that the community’s CC&Rs “effectively prohibited” the homeowners from installing a solar device within the meaning of Arizona’s
solar access law.192 Particularly noteworthy is that the court invoked
the public policy exception in support of its holding.193 The court cited
to Nahrstedt in stating that the present situation was distinguishable
in that “no state law established a public policy preference for allowing homeowners to keep animals, have rooftop antennas, or store old
vehicles. In contrast, here we must consider the application of a spe187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1286-87 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 1286.
62 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 984.
Id.
Id. at 988.
Id. at 988-89.
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cific statute that nullifies enforcement of deed restrictions that effectively prohibit the installation and use of SEDs.”194
Furthermore, the court came to its decision in spite of the fact that
Arizona’s solar rights law195 did not contain an affirmative statement
of public policy.196 Fortunately for the homeowners, the court made a
substantial inquiry into the policy behind the statute, utilizing “the
statute’s context, language, subject matter, historical background,
effects and consequences, spirit and purpose.” 197 Yet as mentioned
previously, there is fierce debate within the judicial community over
how much weight to afford legislative history and intent, among various other factors, in interpreting statutes. 198 This serves to again
highlight the significance of state legislatures including such an affirmative statement of public policy in their solar access laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although economic costs are often cited as the greatest barrier to
the proliferation of solar energy in the United States, legal constraints are often overlooked. As one commentator recently noted,
“[t]he potential renewable energy from residential solar use and the
potential legal barriers to utilizing that energy are staggering.” 199
Uncertainty regarding the legality of a solar installation has the capacity to derail many a potential project.200 Legal fees are all too often
another cost to be borne by citizens who are forced into court to defend their installation of a solar device. 201 Furthermore, while the
cost and efficiency of solar energy is largely determined by the mar194. Id. at 989 (internal citation omitted) (substituting “SEDs” for “Solar Energy Devices”).
195. The statute at issue in the case was ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-439 (2003). The
Arizona statute cited above, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816, was passed in 2007 and, in
fact, incorporated some of the “lessons” learned from Garden Lakes. This included replacing the phrase “effectively prohibit” with “shall not prohibit.” § 33-1816(A). However, the
new statute still allowed associations to impose “reasonable rules”—potentially trading one
weasel phrase for another—although it gives some guidance as to how those rules may
operate. § 33-1816(B).
196. § 33-439.
197. Garden Lakes, 62 P.3d at 986.
198. C.f. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Because the use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of
any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face—I do not join this portion of
the Court’s opinion.”); Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 958 (2005) (“It ought to be an uncontroversial proposition that
the evolution of . . . federal statutes that have evolved over long periods of time, should be
relevant to the current ‘plain meaning’ of their provisions.”).
199. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 725.
200. KETTLES, supra note 11, at 7.
201. See Garden Lakes, 62 P.3d at 986; Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v.
Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 227 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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ketplace and the pace of technological development, substantial control can be exerted over the legal regulation of solar energy.
Although it might be argued that community associations are
themselves “democratic”202 organizations, and residents are generally
capable of changing the rules from within, in practice, this can prove
challenging. Changes to established CC&Rs often require a supermajority of homeowners.203 Moreover, homeowners in CIDs are frequently apathetic when it comes to participating in their community governments.204 In one study, “most people surveyed had not only never
attended a meeting but knew neither who is on the board nor the issues facing their neighborhood association.”205
Yet not all common interest developments are resistant to the idea
of solar energy; in fact, some are outright embracing it. All of the
ninety-plus homes in the aptly named Armory Park Del Sol in Tucson, Arizona were built with solar water heaters and electrical systems. 206 As a result, residents pay about $300 per year in electric
bills, despite Arizona’s desert climate.207 Similarly, twenty percent of
the homes in the solar-friendly community of Del Sur in San Diego,
California are equipped with solar electric systems. 208 Community
associations, via their assessment fees and communal governance,
are actually in a position to be pioneers in the realm of residential
solar energy use—if it is something that they choose to prioritize.
However, communities like Armory Park Del Sol and Del Sur are
currently the exception rather than the rule.
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions imposed by communities
in times past were frequently intended to achieve a purpose most
would consider insidious today. Consider, for example, the restrictive
covenants enacted by communities in the mid-20th century designed
to prevent African Americans and other minority groups from owning
property. Perhaps someday future generations will view the efforts of
community associations to restrict renewable energy technology with
similar disdain. Until then, if states are serious about ushering in an
era of renewable energy, they must take care to craft their statutes in
a way that clearly reflects this intent. If legislatures effectuate good
laws that force the hand of courts, so to speak, the path to widespread residential solar use might just get a little bit brighter.

202. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 147 (describing CIDs as an attempt to “realize
democracy through private ordering”).
203. MCKENZIE, supra note 33, at 147.
204. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 158-60.
205. Id. at 159. The author also points out the parallels between general political apathy in the United States and the apathy within CIDs. Id. at 148-63.
206. Tamara Lytle, Harvest the Green, COMMON GROUND, July-Aug. 2009, at 23.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 26.
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VII. APPENDIX A:
HOW STATE SOLAR ACCESS LAWS ADDRESS CC&RS209

States with
Solar Access
Laws that
Address CC&Rs
(21)

“Reasonable”
Restrictions
Allowed
(10)

Specifies How
Restrictions can
Operate (No Use
of Reasonableness)
(3)

May not
“Effectively
Prohibit” or
“Unduly Restrict”
(8)

Colorado
Wisconsin
New Mexico
Florida
Texas
Louisiana
California
Nevada
Utah
Illinois
Indiana
West Virginia
North Carolina
Virginia
Delaware
New Jersey
Massachusetts
Vermont
Maryland
Washington
Hawaii

Louisiana
California
Nevada
Utah (but only
plat renewal or
approval)
Indiana
Virginia
Maryland
Delaware
Massachusetts
Washington

Texas
New Jersey
Hawaii

Wisconsin
Colorado
New Mexico
Illinois
West Virginia
North Carolina
Vermont
Florida

*Oregon’s solar access law, discussed in Part III.B, is not included on
the table as it does not refer specifically to CC&Rs.

209. Table compiled utilizing Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited July 6, 2013).
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